Security Disclosure
Notareum handles cryptographically signed identity for blockchain resources, collateralized validator economics, and governance-controlled protocol parameters. Security is a protocol-wide priority. This page defines how to report a vulnerability, the disclosure timeline you can expect, the bug bounty structure, and the scope.Reporting
Contact:security@notareum.org
Do not file public GitHub issues, forum posts, Discord messages, or tweets for security-relevant findings. Public disclosure before a coordinated fix exposes users to avoidable harm and disqualifies the finding from bounty eligibility.
Include:
- A concise description of the vulnerability.
- Affected component (contract address, SDK package + version, dApp URL).
- Impact: what a malicious actor could achieve.
- Reproduction steps or a working proof of concept.
- Your preferred bounty-reward recipient address (EVM address is sufficient).
- Whether you want public attribution after disclosure.
PGP
For sensitive disclosures, encrypt your report to the security PGP key.- Key ID:
TBD, published alongside the first audit report - Fingerprint:
TBD - Key URL:
https://notareum.org/.well-known/security-pgp.asc
Acknowledgement
Initial acknowledgement within 48 hours of report receipt. Triage result and severity assessment within 5 business days. Fix targets depend on severity (see timeline below).Disclosure timeline
Coordinated disclosure operates on a 90-day standard timeline:- Day 0. Report received. Acknowledgement sent within 48 hours.
- Day 0–5. Triage, severity assessment, internal reproduction.
- Day 5–30. Fix development for Critical/High. Shorter for trivial fixes; longer for invariant-level redesigns may warrant an extension request.
- Day 30–60. Audit of the fix by independent reviewers where warranted.
- Day 60–90. Coordinated deployment across affected contracts and SDKs. Advisory drafted.
- Day 90. Public advisory published. Researcher attributed (if they opted in). CVE filed where applicable.
Severity
Severity is assessed using a CVSS-style qualitative scale adapted for crypto-economic systems:- Critical. Direct theft of user funds, arbitrary minting, indefinite loss of protocol control, or invariant violation in a core contract.
- High. Indirect theft (requires secondary conditions), severe economic griefing (forced slashing, stuck validators), material governance bypass.
- Medium. Denial of service on non-critical paths, unintended access to governance metadata, signature-scheme weaknesses under non-standard assumptions.
- Low. Informational, low-impact inconsistency, documentation-only issues.
Bug bounty
A reward is paid in$NOTA at the severity-appropriate tier. Amounts below are illustrative and ratified by governance at program activation; see the latest bounty announcement on forum.notareum.org for authoritative figures.
Rewards within the range are determined by:
- Impact magnitude and reach (funds at risk, number of affected users).
- Exploitability (immediate vs requires improbable preconditions).
- Report quality (clarity, reproducibility, patch suggestion).
- Uniqueness (first reporter of a given class of bug).
Scope
In scope
- All deployed Notareum contracts on supported networks:
NotaRegistry,VerificationEngine,ValidatorStaking,NOTAToken,veNOTA,FeeManager,SlashingManager,AccessManager,Governor, and anyNotareumVestingVaultinstances referenced in the release manifest. - Source in the
contractsrepository onmainand any tagged release. - The TypeScript SDK (
@notareum/sdk), Python SDK (notareum), and Rust SDK (notareum). - The reference dApp (
dapprepository). - The canonical
addresses.jsondistribution and its signature-verification path.
Out of scope
- Findings that require physical access to a user’s device or social-engineering the user.
- Denial of service against L1 gas markets (e.g., congestion).
- Attacks on third-party dependencies (OpenZeppelin, ethers, web3.py, alloy) unless the attack is made exploitable by Notareum-specific usage.
- Theoretical attacks without demonstrable exploitability under realistic parameters.
- Informational gas optimizations that do not enable an attack.
- Findings against end-user wallets that happen to integrate Notareum; those go to the wallet vendor.
Safe harbor
Good-faith security research conducted under this policy will not be pursued for:- Violations of applicable anti-hacking laws (e.g., CFAA).
- Violations of anti-circumvention laws (e.g., DMCA).
- Breaches of Notareum’s terms of service.
- Makes a good-faith effort to avoid privacy violations, data destruction, or service disruption.
- Limits testing to accounts they own or have explicit permission to use.
- Reports promptly and gives Notareum a reasonable opportunity to remediate before public disclosure.
- Does not exploit the vulnerability for direct personal benefit beyond the bounty.
Post-mortem policy
After any exploited vulnerability (in scope or out), Notareum publishes a post-mortem within 30 days of resolution containing:- Timeline of the incident from discovery to resolution.
- Root cause analysis.
- Impact assessment (funds affected, users affected).
- Fix description and verification.
- Process improvements adopted to prevent recurrence.
github.com/notareum/audits/postmortems and cross-posted on the Mirror blog.
Hall of fame
Researchers who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities are listed (with permission) on a community hall of fame atsecurity.notareum.org. Hall-of-fame entries include the researcher handle, date, severity, and a sanitized description of the finding.
Not a vulnerability
A few classes of report we commonly receive but do not treat as vulnerabilities:- “The contract is upgradeable.” UUPS upgradeability is an intentional design, gated by timelocked governance.
- “Validators can collude.” Collusion is an explicit threat model; the protocol addresses it via slashing, stake requirements, and economic cost analysis. Reports must show an attack cheaper than the modeled cost bound.
- “A user can create a misleading
.nota.” Issuer misrepresentation is covered by verification levels and revocation; this is the protocol’s normal operating model. - “Gas costs are high on L1.” Out of scope.

